"From a better understanding of the drivers of populism to a new political agenda"

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Drivers of populism


- Root causes of populism can be roughly categorized into
 - 1. Cultural Roots

Norms/Values/Beliefs, Ideology, Psychological factors

2. Economic Roots


Inequalities caused by macro-economic developments

- Populist campaigning concentrates on 1., while 2. makes people susceptible to populism
- Focus here on economic roots, since
 - 2. is more relevant for explaining recent dynamics
 - 2. can be addressed by economic policy




- 1999 European Parl. Elections
- Far-right vote share


• Ø 3.89%




- 2004 European Parl. Elections
- Far-right vote share
- Ø 9.33%




- 2009 European Parl. Elections
- Far-right vote share
- Ø 10.64%



- 2014
 European Parl. Elections
- Far-right vote share
- Ø 16.09%




- 2019
 European Parl. Elections
- Far-right vote share
- Ø 21.27%



- 2009-2019 European Parl. Elections
- Δ Far-right vote share
- Ø +10.62 pp

Research on economic causes of populism



→ Policy options?

- Welfare policies help to cushion adverse impacts of economic shocks, including political consequences
 - E.g. Colantone and Stanig (2018): Import competition increases populist support in structurally declining regions in Europe
 - Glitsch (2021): This effect is centered on countries with weak welfare states (as in Rodrik, 2018) ...
 - ... and countries that cut down welfare benefits (as in Fetzer, 2019)
- Welfare policies alone are not sufficient to counter populism
 - Welfare policies may insure against most severe consequences of economic shocks
 - → Policy must provide new development perspectives, not to just compensate income losses

- Labor market adjustments translate economic shocks into "populist backlash" (e.g. Dippel et al., 2021)
- Unemployment is a driver of populist support, but also skill-divide
 - High skilled individuals benefit from structural change
 populist support decreases
 - Lower skilled individuals fear losing their jobs, and face decreasing upward mobility → populist support increases
- LM policies may not aim at decreasing unemployment only
 - Must invest into training and qualification of lower-skilled workforce
 - → Policy must enable employees with comparatively low qualification to participate in job upgrading that comes with globalization and technological change

- People living in deprived regions turn to supporting populists, even if not directly affected by LM adjustments
- Regional development policies like ERDF help to mitigate "populist backlash" (Gold and Lehr 2021, Albanese et al. 2019)
 - But cannot revert trend of functional specialization of regions
- Shift focus from "convergence" to "smart specialization"
 - Create development trajectories according to regional strengths, taking regional embeddedness into account, e.g.
 - Invest into transport and digital infrastructure in commuting regions
 - Invest into green tourism in remote but scenic regions
 - Provide assistance in regional planning to local administrations
 - → Policy must enable peripheral regions to participate in the success of urban centers

- Anti-migration rhetoric is THE uniting element for rightpopulists, but difficult to identify effects of migration
 - "Perception" matters more than actual "exposure" to migration
 - Effects depend on salience, type of migration, migrant characteristics, characteristics of recipient regions, etc.
- Scope for economic policies along 3 dimensions:
 - 1. Deprived regions/voters are more susceptible to populist rhetoric
 - 2. Labor market competition between migrants and "natives"
 - 3. Competition for public goods
- Both 1) and 2) can be addressed by policies above
- Public goods supply should not be shortened when immigration is high
- Policy design may mitigate perception of competition
- \rightarrow Economic policy must accompany migration and integration policies

- Economics may explain increasing "demand for populism", but populists successfully tap into this voting potential
- Success of the supply side relates to communication style
 - Little ideology
 - People vs. Elites, "will of the people" vs. institutions
 - Opinion & emotion vs. facts & figures
 - Easy solutions vs. complex negotiations
- This style has transcended into the mainstream, obstructing serious political debates in public
- → Political communication has to adjust to successfully reach out to the voters left behind by globalization and technological change

Conclusion

- To counter populism, policy must address its economic roots, i.e. inequalities from globalization and tech-change
 - Individual disadvantages due to skill bias
 - Regional disadvantages due to functional specialization
- Policy must not "compensate losers", but generate perspectives for disadvantaged communities
 - Welfare state policies to provide basic security
 - Labor market policies that increase upward (sectoral) mobility
 - Regional policies that create new development trajectories
 - Public spending to reduce (perceived) distributional conflict
- Political communication must adjust to better inform voters about economic developments and related policies

Thank you for your attention